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INTRODUCTION
For over one hundred and thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has
addressed the federal issues implicated in divorce, sometimes addressing state
powers over divorce where only one of the parties is domiciled in the jurisdiction
and at other times addressing the conditions under which divorces granted in one
jurisdiction must be recognized in another. The Court's understanding of the
Constitution's dictates on these issues has changed dramatically over time, although
the Court has consistently interpreted the Constitution to require that at least one of
the parties be domiciled in a state in order for a court in that jurisdiction to have the
power to grant a divorce. Several state courts have issued divorce decrees while
knowing that neither of the interested parties was domiciled in the state, predicting
that the Court would modify the jurisprudence if given the opportunity. But such a
prediction, if in error, could cause havoc in a number of families, and the Court
should decide this issue at its earliest opportunity if only to reduce the number of
families at risk of being torn asunder by an adverse ruling.
Part I of this article discusses the constitutional requirements for courts to have
jurisdiction to grant divorce decrees and the conditions under which such decrees
will trigger full faith and credit guarantees. Part II discusses the practices in some
states, where courts (sometimes authorized by local law) have been issuing divorce
decrees even where the (purported) constitutional requirements have not been met.
The article concludes that while states may have good reasons for permitting courts
to grant a divorce to individuals not domiciled there, states doing so put potential
future families at risk in ways that the interested individuals likely neither understand
nor appreciate. For the sake of those individuals and society as a whole, the Court
must clarify the jurisprudence at its earliest opportunity.
I. DIVORCE AND INTERSTATE RECOGNITION
When individuals are born in a state and live and die in that same state,
that state's law governs the individuals' marriages and divorces.2 When
2 The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws reads as follows:
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party, though the
requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid
everywhere in the following cases:
(a) polygamous marriage,
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their marriage is contrary
to a strong public policy of the domicil,
(c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are at the domicil
regarded as odious,
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even though
celebrated in another state.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
The Second Restatement similarly reads as follows:
A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will
everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state
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individuals are born in one state, marry in another, and then settle (possibly for only
awhile) in a third, however, a more nuanced approach is required to determine which
jurisdiction's law governs the parties' possible divorce. The Court has long struggled
to explicate the Constitution's limitations on which states may grant divorces and the
conditions under which such divorces are entitled to full faith and credit, often raising
at least as many questions as had been answered.
A. Granting Divorces
When two individuals who are domiciled in one state both marry and divorce
there, that state's law governs.3 More difficult issues arise, however, when two
individuals marry and live in one state but then one of the parties seeks a divorce in
another.4 The Court's understanding of the Constitution's approach to these kinds of
cases has evolved over several decades, although some issues still require
clarification.
Maynard v. Hill suggests some of the issues that can arise when the validity of a
divorce is called into question.5 David and Lydia Maynard married in Vermont and
then moved to Ohio.6 David left Lydia in Ohio with their two children, Henry and
Frances, and went out west in search of better opportunities.' He settled in
Washington territory "as a married man, [on] a tract of land of 640 acres."8 That
same year, he was granted a divorce from Lydia by the legislature,9 and, within four
weeks of the divorce, he married Catherine Brashears.°
which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
the marriage.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
3 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CoNcrOF LAWS § 70 (AM. LAWINsT. 1971) ("A state has power to exercise
judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage ofspouses both of whom are domiciled in the state").
' See, e.g., id. § 71 ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of
spouses one of whom is domiciled in the state."); RESTATEMENT (FtRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § I l
(AM. LAW INST. 1934) ("A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage
when neither spouse is domiciled within the state."). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 72 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the
marriage of spouses, neither of whom is domiciled in the state, if either spouse has such a relationship to
the state as would make it reasonable for the state to dissolve the marriage.").
'See generally Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
6 Id. at 191-92 ("In 1828 David S. Maynard and Lydia A. Maynard intermarried in the State of
Vermont, and lived there together as husband and wife until 1850, when they removed to Ohio.").
7 See id. at 192.
8 Id.
9 Id. ("On the 22d day of December, 1852, an act was passed by the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory, purporting to dissolve the bonds of matrimony between him and his wife.").
" Id. at 193 ("On or about the 15th of January, 1853, the husband thus divorced intermarried with
one Catherine T. Brashears, and thereafter they lived together as husband and wife until his death.").
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Lydia, who did not even have notice of the divorce until months after it had been
awarded,1 claimed that the divorce was void. 2 But if the divorce was void and her
marriage to David was still valid when the interest in the 640 acres vested by virtue
of the land having been cultivated for the requisite number of years,13 then she was
entitled to her share of the land.'4
When the land had been cultivated for the required period, the Secretary of the
Interior decided that David Maynard was entitled to his share of the land, but that
neither Lydia (the first wife who was divorced before the interest in the land vested)
nor Catherine (the second wife who was not married to David at the beginning of the
relevant period as defined by law) was entitled to a portion of the land.'5 Because
neither of the women had an interest in the land, it "was treated as public land"'16 and
was eventually acquired by Hill and Lewis.'7
Lydia, whom David had predeceased by six years, died in 1879.18 The couple's
children, Henry C. Maynard and Frances J. Patterson,'9 were Lydia's heirs and they
sought to force Hill and Lewis to convey to them the deed to the contested property.
20
The Maynard Court understood that an important issue was whether a divorce
granted by a legislature was valid.2' But unpacking that issue required examination
of several issues, some (but not others) of which were addressed by the Court. For
example, the Court simply did not address whether Lydia's allegation that she had
not received actual or constructive notice of the divorce, if true, was a basis upon
which the divorce should be nullified. Instead, the Court focused on whether a
" Id. ("The complaint alleges that no cause existed at any time for this divorce; that no notice was
given to the wife of any application by the husband for a divorce, or of the introduction or pendency of
the bill for that act in the Legislative Assembly; that she had no knowledge of the passage of the act until
July, 1853;....").
12 Id. (arguing that the act granting the divorce "is absolutely void; and that the parties were never
lawfully divorced").
"3 See id. at 214 ("[T]hat act conferred the title of the land only upon the settler who at the time was
a resident of the Territory, or should be a resident of the Territory before December 1, 1850, and who
should reside upon and cultivate the land for four consecutive years.").
14 See id. at 194 ("On a subsequent hearing before the register and receiver, the first wife appeared,
and they awarded the east half of the claim to her and the west half to the husband."); id. at 214 ("But it
is contended that Lydia A. Maynard, the first wife of David A. Maynard, was entitled, notwithstanding
the divorce, to the east half of the donation claim.").
1 Id at 194 ("But the Secretary also held that, at the time ofthe alleged divorce, the husband possessed only an
inchoate interest in the lands, and whether it should ever become a vested interest depended upon his future
compliance with the conditions prescribed by the statute; that his first wife accordingly possessed no vested interest
in the property. He also held that the second wife was not entitled to any portion of the claim, because she was not
his wife on the first day of December, 1850, or within one year from that date, which was necessary, to entitle her to
one-half of the claim under the statute; ....').
"1 d. ("[T]he east half of the claim was treated as public land, and was surveyed and platted as such
under the direction of the Commissioner of the General Land Office.").
17 Id. at 194-95.
1 Id at 192 ("David S. Maynard died intestate in the year 1873, and Lydia A- Maynard in the year 1879.").
'9 Id. ("The plaintiffs, Henry C. Maynard and Frances J. Patterson, are their children ... ").
20 Id. at 195 ("[The plaintiffs] pray that the defendants may be ... directed to convey the lands to
them by a good and sufficient deed; ....").
21 Id. at 203 ("[F]irst, was the act of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Oregon of the 22d
of December, 1852, declaring the bonds of matrimony between David S. Maynard and his wife dissolved,
valid and effectual to divorce the parties... [?]").
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legislature rather than a judge could issue a divorce, suggesting that the resolution of
that matter cannot be determined "by reference to the distinctions usually made
between legislative acts and such as are judicial or administrative in their character,
but by an examination of the subjects upon which legislatures had been in the
practice of acting with the consent and approval of the people they represented.
22 If
there has been a "long acquiescence in repeated acts of legislation on particular
matters," then there "is evidence that those matters have been generally considered
by the people as properly within legislative control. '23 Where the people had
expressed their will through such acquiescence, "[s]uch acts are not to be set aside
or treated as invalid, because upon a careful consideration of their character doubts
may arise as to the competency of the legislature to pass them. 24 Thus, the Court
rejected that the Maynards' divorce was void and of no legal effect merely because
it had been granted by a legislative body rather than a judge.25
The Court explained that it was not as if legislatures lacked familiarity with
domestic relations issues:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other
institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That
body prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the
procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and
obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present
and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its
dissolution.
26
Yet, the Court's point that the legislature sets the requirements for marriage and
divorce as a general matter does not establish that the legislature should be deciding
whether a particular person should be awarded a divorce, especially if that person's
spouse is not available to present his or her defense. Nonetheless, historically, almost
all of the state legislatures had granted divorces,2 7 so it could not be argued that this
was the kind of act that legislatures were ill-suited to perform. Further, the
legislature's having exercised its power in this case had a variety of legal
consequences, and the Court was wary of upsetting a variety of settled expectations,
such as "[r]ights acquired[] or obligations incurred," merely because of "differences
of opinion as to the department of government to which the acts [issuing divorces]
are properly assignable."28 The Court noted that considerations of reasonable and
settled expectations had "special force.., when the validity of acts dissolving the
bonds of matrimony is assailed, the legitimacy of many children, the peace of many
families, and the settlement of many estates depending upon its being sustained."29
22 1d. at 204.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 204-06.
26 Id. at 205.
27 Id. at 206 ("[L]egislative divorces have been granted, with few exceptions, in all the States.").
2 8
1 d. at 204.
29 Id. at 204-05.
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For example, if the divorce was declared invalid, Henry and Frances would
presumably have not only been entitled to the land owned by Hill and Lewis but also
to the land owned by Catherine Maynard, which she had acquired by virtue of having
been Maynard's widow.3"
The Maynard Court chose not to address the problem posed by Lydia Maynard's
allegedly not having received any notice that her husband was seeking a divorce.31
The Court instead waited until later cases to discuss the kind of notice that is due in
order for a divorce to qualify for flil faith and credit guarantees.
B. Divorce and Full Faith and Credit
In Atherton v. Atherton, the Court addressed whether constructive notice would
suffice to establish the validity of a divorce and make that decree subject to full faith
and credit guarantees.32 Peter and Mary Atherton married in New York but then
moved to Kentucky where they lived with his parents.33 They had a child,34 but
shortly afterward Peter was allegedly "cruel and abusive," causing Mary to take their
child and move back to New York.35 When leaving, she made quite clear that she
had no intention of ever returning to live with him in Kentucky.36
When Mary had been absent for more than a year, Peter filed for divorce.37
Pursuant to local law, a local attorney chosen by the court sent a notice to the post
office near where Mary lived explaining that Peter was seeking a divorce and
outlining what she might do in response.38 The attorney asked that he letter be
returned to him if it could not be delivered to her.39 As he explained to the court, the
attorney neither heard from her nor received the letter in return mail.' Because the
local procedures for giving Mary constructive notice had been followed,4' the court
granted Peter a divorce, finding that Mary had abandoned him.
42
'o See Mark Strasser, Marriage, Divorce, andDomicile, 85 UMKC L. REv. 145, 159 (2016) ("[l]f the
divorce were nullified, Catherine would not have been entitled to the western half of the land, which
became hers upon David's death.").
3" But see Chavez-Rey v. Chavez-Rey, 213 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ('The appellee
had neither actual nor constructive notice of the divorce action pending against her. Therefore, the court
had no jurisdiction over her, and the divorce decree was void.").
32 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 161-72 (1901).
3 Id. at 155 ("On October 17, 1888, the parties were married at Clinton, Oneida County, New York,
the plaintiff being a resident of that place, and the defendant a resident of Louisville, Kentucky.
Immediately after the marriage, the parties went to and resided at Louisville, in the house with the
defendant's parents .... ").
3 Id. ("[T]he parties ... had a child born to them on January 8, 1890 ... 
5Id. at 155-56.
36 Id. at 156 ("When she so left him and went to Clinton, she did so with the purpose and intention of
not returning to the State of Kentucky, but of permanently residing in the State of New York; and this
purpose and intention were understood by the defendant at the time ....").
37 Id. at 158 ("[T]he defendant, Mary G. Atherton, without fault upon the part of the plaintiff,
abandoned him, and that said abandonment has continued without interruption from that ime to this, and
at the filing of the petition herein had existed for more than one year; ....
31 See id. at 161.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 161, 172-73.
42 Id. at 172-73.
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In the meantime, Mary had filed for a divorce from Peter in New York.43 In his
answer to her suit, he not only denied that he had ever been cruel but also asserted
that he had already obtained a divorce." The New York court reasoned that it did not
have to give full faith and credit to the divorce judgment from Kentucky because
Mary had never been personally served and, in addition, had never authorized anyone
to represent her in the Kentucky proceeding.4 5 Further, Mary was now a New York
rather than a Kentucky domiciliay.
4 6
The Atherton Court held that because Kentucky had always been the husband's
domicile and had in addition been the marital domicile, the constructive service
sufficed to give the Kentucky court the power to grant the divorce.47 Because the
service was adequate48 and likely gave her actual notice of the Kentucky
proceeding,49 New York's failure to recognize the Kentucky decree violated full faith
and credit guarantees and thus the New York divorce decree could not stand.5"
Once Kentucky had granted Peter the divorce, the marriage was over and thus there
was no marriage for the New York court to dissolve. The Atherton Court explained:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law.51
It was unclear how significant a role was played by Kentucky having been the
marital domicile. The majority had noted that Kentucky had been the only state that
had been the marital domicile,52 and Justice Peckham had argued in dissent that if
Peter had "been guilty of such misconduct and cruelty towards his wife as entitled
her to a divorce, she had a legal right for that reason to leave him and to acquire-a
separate domicil, even in another State."53 Further, if she had rightfully
"acquire[d] a separate domicil in New York State,' 5 4 Justice Peckham argued that
"the Kentucky court did not obtain jurisdiction over her as an absent defendant, by
431d. at 155.
44Id. at 157.451d. at 159.
46 Id.
41 Id. at 171-73; see also Comment, Jurisdiction in Divorce Proceedings, 12 YALE L.J. 385, 386
(1903) ("Thus, it was held in Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, that where the plaintiff has a bona fide
domicil in the State of the matrimonial domicil, that State has such jurisdiction of the subject matter,
-though the defendant is served with constructive notice only,-as to require other States to recognize
the divorce granted, as valid and binding on both parties.").
48Atherton, 181 U.S. at 172.
41 Cf id ("It may be doubted whether this negatives her having received, or had knowledge of, the letter sent to
her by the attorney in Kentucky, January 5, 1893, six days before she began her suit n New York.").
5o Id. at 173.
"' Id. at 162.
52 Id. at 171 ("[T]he divorce in Kentucky was by the court of the State ... which was the only
matrimonial domicil of the husband and wife.").
" Id. at 173 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
54 Id.
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publication of process or sending a copy thereof through the mail to her address in
New York.""5 One cannot tell whether the Atherton Court upheld the Kentucky
divorce because Mary Atherton had never proved that she had justifiably abandoned
her husband or if, instead, constructive notice sufficed to make the valid divorce
decree subject to full faith and credit guarantees, notwithstanding that she had
rightfully acquired a separate domicile in New York. Clarification of these issues
was left for another day.
Bell v. Bell involved somewhat similar facts, although there were some important
differences.5 6 The Bells had married in Bloomington, Illinois, and had thereafter
lived in New York. 7 Mary Bell went to visit her mother in Bloomington, and at that
time Frederick had May's belongings packed up, readying them to be sent to Mary's
mother's home.8 Mary went back to Buffalo with her mother for a few days and
then returned to Illinois, although Mary always claimed that her domicile was in
Buffalo. 9
Frederick sought a divorce in Pennsylvania on the ground of desertion after
claiming to have resided there for a year.' While Mary was not served personally,61
she learned through the mail of the impending divorce action.62 She neither appeared
in person nor through an attorney, and her husband was awarded the divorce.
63
Mary sued Frederick for divorce in New York, claiming that he had committed
adultery.' In response, he claimed that the Pennsylvania divorce was entitled to full
faith and credit.65 But the Bell Court noted that Frederick had sworn that he was a
New York domiciliary a mere ten weeks before he had claimed to have been residing
in Pennsylvania for the past year.66 The Court explained that "[n]o valid divorce from
the bond of matrimony can be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a State
in which neither party is domiciled, ' 7 which meant that the Pennsylvania
"decree of divorce was entitled to no faith and credit in New York or in any other
State.
6 8
55 d.
56 See generally Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
5' Id at 176 ('aThe parties were married at Bloomington in the State of Illinois on January 24, 1878, and
thereafter lived together as husband and wife at Rochester, and afterwards at Buffalo, in the State of New Yok.").
58 Id. ("[Tjhe plaintiff went to Bloomington on a visit to her mother. In her absence, the defendant
packed up her wearing apparel and other property in trunks, and had them put in the stable, preparatory
to sending them to her at Bloomington.").
591id.
60 Id.
61 id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 175.
65 Id. at 177.
66 Id. at 178 ("[S]ome ten weeks before he filed his petition in Pennsylvania, he described himself,
under oath, in a petition for the probate of a will in Erie County in the State of New York, as a resident of
that county; and [] no evidence was offered that he actually changed his domicil from New York to
Pennsylvania."); see also id. at 177-78 ("[B]y the law of Pennsylvania every petitioner for a divorce must
have had a bonafide residence within the State for one year next before the filing of the petition.").
67 Id. at 177.
68Id. at 178.
Vol. 108
DIVORCE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The Bell Court's conclusion that the divorce was not entitled to full faith and
credit was unobjectionable,69 although the Court's having framed its conclusion in
such a careful way made it potentially misleading. Suppose, for example, that service
had been actual rather than constructive. Would the decree be subject to full faith
and credit even though neither of the parties had been domiciled in Pennsylvania?
Streitwolf v. Streitwolf° helped clarify the Court's position. The Court held that
a divorce decree granted in North Dakota was not entitled to full faith and credit
because neither the husband nor the wife had ever been domiciled there,7 even
though the wife had been personally served with notice of her husband's filing for
divorce in North Dakota.72 In this case, the wife neither appeared nor hired an
attorney to represent her in North Dakota.3
Together, Bell and Streitwolf stand for the proposition that an ex parte divorce
decree74 issued in a state where neither of the parties is domiciled is not subject to
full faith and credit guarantees, whether the notice afforded to the opposing party is
actual or constructive.75 Guidance about how ex parte divorces should be treated may
not be particularly helpful, however, when analyzing whether other divorces trigger
full faith and credit guarantees.76 Suppose, for example, that an attorney was hired
to represent he party opposing the divorce in a jurisdiction where, allegedly, neither
party was domiciled. The Court addressed this issue in Andrews v. Andrews,77
although there were some complicating factors that made the implications of the
decision somewhat more difficult to understand.
69 See id ("[Tihe court in Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction of the husband's uit for divorce, because
neither party had a domicil in Pennsylvania ....
70 181 U.S. 179, 182-83 (1901).
"' See id. at 183 ("[T]he husband had no bonafide domicil in the State of North Dakota, when he
obtained a divorce there, and it is not pretended that the wife had an independent domicil in North Dakota,
or was ever in that State. The court of that State, therefore, had no jurisdiction.").
72 Id. at 179.
71 See id. at 180 (noting that "the wife had not in anywise appeared in that suit").74 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 39 (1903) (noting that "the decrees of divorce which were under
consideration in Bell v. Bell and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf were rendered in
ex parte proceedings"), abrogated by Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); see also Sheila Jordan
Cunningham, Jurisdiction in the Ex Parte Divorce: Do Absent Spouses Have a Protected Due Process
Interest in Their Marital Status?, 13 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 205, 221 n.105 (1983) ("[D]ivorce decrees
granted ex parte by a forum in which neither spouse was domiciled were not entitled to full faith and
credit." (first citing Streitwolf 181 U.S. at 183; and then citing Bell, 181 U.S. at 177)).
71 Compare Bell, 181 U.S. at 177 (explaining that "[n]o valid divorce from the bond of matrimony
can be decreed on constructive service by the courts of a State in which neither party is domiciled"),
with Streitwolf 181 U.S. at 179, 183 (holding that an ex parte divorce decree granted in North Dakota was
not entitled to full faith and credit because neither the husband nor the wife had ever been domiciled there
despite the fact that personal service to the wife had provided actual notice of the proceedings).76 Cf Andrews, 188 U.S. at 39 ("But it is said that the decrees of divorce which were under consideration in Bell
v. Bell and Streitwolfv. Slreitwo/fwere rendered in exparte proceedings, the defendants having been summoned by
substituted service, and making no appearance; hence, the case now under consideration is taken out of the rule
announced in those cases, since here the defendant appeared and consequently became subject to the jurisdiction of
the court by which the decree of divorce was rendered").
77 Id. at 16-18.
2019-2020
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Charles and Kate Andrews had married in Boston and lived together in
Massachusetts.78  They had marital difficulties and Kate sought separate
maintenance, although that suit was later dismissed in December 1890 after the
parties reached their own agreement.
79
The following summer, Charles went to South Dakota.8" He had no business there
other than to obtain a divorce from Kate,8 1 and boarded in a hotel rather than leasing
an apartment or buying a home.82 He did, however, vote in a state election while he
was there,83 and voting in a local election is traditionally one of the indicia of having
acquired a domicile.84
Kate received notice of his filing for divorce, and she engaged local counsel to
contest the suit.85 She denied that he was a South Dakota domiciliary and, in addition,
denied that she had deserted him. 86 She contended instead that he had been cruel to
her. 87
Charles and Kate reached an agreement whereby in exchange for a sum of money
she agreed to permit him to obtain a divorce on the ground of desertion.
88
Kate instructed her attorney to withdraw her appearance, and Charles was granted a
divorce.89 Within days of being awarded the divorce, Charles left the state to return
to Massachusetts, where he lived until his death.9° Shortly after his return to
Massachusetts, he met Annie whom he subsequently married.91 They had two
children together.
92
Annie had no knowledge that the South Dakota divorce might be subject to
challenge,93 and Kate never challenged the validity of the divorce during Charles's
lifetime, instead waiting until she applied to be the executrix of his estate.94
The Massachusetts court addressing who should be considered Charles's lawful
widow found that Charles had always been a Massachusetts domiciliary and that the
7 Id. at 16 ("Charles S. and Kate H. Andrews married in Boston in April, 1887, and they lived together
at their matrimonial domicil in the State of Massachusetts.").
79 Id. ("In April, 1890, the wife began a suit for separate maintenance, which was dismissed in
December, 1890, because of a settlement between the parties, adjusting their property relations.").
8
0 Id.
81 Id. ("He... had no other business there than the prosecution of this divorce suit.").
82 Id. ("He boarded at a hotel in Sioux Falls all the time .... ").
8' Id. ("[H]e voted there at a state election in the fall of 1891, claiming the right to do so as a bona
fide resident under the laws of that State.").
84 Cf. Wamsley v. Wansley, 635 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Md. 1994) (suggesting that where a person votes
is one of the more important factors in establishing domicile).
85 Andrews, 188 U.S. at 16 ("The wife received notice, and appeared by counsel ....
86
Id. at 16-17.
1
7
Id. at 17.
88 id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. ("Annie Andrews married Charles S. Andrews in good faith and in ignorance of any illegality
in the South Dakota divorce . .
94 Id.
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South Dakota divorce could not be recognized by Massachusetts, which meant that
Kate rather than Annie would administer the estate.95
Massachusetts law precluded the recognition of a divorce obtained elsewhere by
a Massachusetts domiciliary on a ground that would not have provided a basis for a
divorce in Massachusetts.96  When analyzing the constitutionality of the
Massachusetts denial of the divorce's validity, the Andrews Court quoted from
Maynard: "Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of the people than any other institution, has
always been subject to the control of the legislature."97 Continuing to cite Maynard
to support its analysis, the Andrews Court explained that once a marriage had been
contracted, "the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and
liabilities." 98 Because marriage "is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress," that relationship
"is an institution, in the maintenance of which.., the public is deeply interested."'9 9
The Massachusetts law denying recognition was "directed . . . against the
execution in Massachusetts of decrees of divorce obtained in other States by persons
who are domiciled in Massachusetts." 100 Massachusetts domiciliaries who seek
divorces elsewhere because those divorces could not be secured at home "go into
such other States with the purpose of practicing a fraud upon the laws of the State of
their domicil; that is, to procure a divorce without obtaining a bonafide domicil in
such other State."10' Requiring that states give full faith and credit to fraudulent
divorces would be an affront to state sovereignty. An important aspect of sovereignty
involves the state's power over the marital status of its own citizens, and that power
would be severely undermined if a state's domiciliary could step over the border,
change his or her marital status, and then return home, forcing the state to recognize
the new marital status. The Andrews Court reasoned:
[fIf a State may not forbid the enforcement within its borders of a decree
of divorce procured by its own citizens who, whilst retaining their domicil
in the prohibiting State, have gone into another State to procure a divorce
95 Id. at 18 ("From the evidence above stated the ultimate facts were found to be that Andrews had
always retained his domicil in Massachusetts .... [I]t was decided that the decree rendered in South
Dakota was void in the State of Massachusetts, and hence that Kate H. Andrews was the widow of Charles
S. Andrews and entitled to administer his estate.").
96 The Massachusetts law states:
A divorce decreed in another State or country according to the laws thereof by a court having
jurisdiction of the cause and of both the parties, shall be valid and effectual in this
Commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of this Commonwealth goes into another State or country
to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred here, while the parties resided here, or for a
cause which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this Commonwealth, a divorce so
obtained shall be of no force or effect in this Commonwealth.
Id. at 29 (quoting 2 Mass. Comp. Laws 1902, ch. 152, p. 1357; Pub. Stat. ch. 146, § 41).
17 Id. at 30 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)).
" Id. at 31 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210).
99
1d. (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210).
100 Id.
101 Id.
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in fraud of the laws of the domicil, [then] the existence of all efficacious
power on the subject of divorce will be at an end.'°2
Where both parties are domiciled in a particular state, a different state will not
acquire jurisdiction to grant a divorce merely because one of the parties visits there
temporarily. Any decree issued under those circumstances is not entitled to full faith
and credit °3 because the court issuing the decree would not have had the authority
to do so.
10
4
The Andrews Court interpreted South Dakota law to require "domicil, and not
mere residence, [as] the basis of divorce proceedings in that State."' 05 Yet, the Court
was not thereby suggesting that the holding would have been different had South
Dakota law merely required residence, because "domicil in that State was essential
to give jurisdiction to the courts of such State to render a decree of divorce which
would have extra-territorial effect""' and because "the appearance of one or both of
the parties to a divorce proceeding could not suffice to confer jurisdiction over the
subject matter where it was wanting because of the absence of domicil within the
State." 017 Because the South Dakota court did not have jurisdiction to grant the
divorce, the Massachusetts court was not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause
"to give effect to the decree of divorce in question."'
08
The line of cases from Maynard to Andrews sets out a jurisprudence that is not
transparent in all respects, and the Court in Haddock v. Haddock'°9 sought to clarify
the jurisprudence. The Haddocks married in New York, and Harriet Haddock
remained there after the wedding."' John, who claimed that he had been fraudulently
induced to marry, abandoned Harriet shortly after the ceremony."' He moved to
Connecticut, where he was eventually awarded a divorce.12 Years later, Harriet filed
for divorce in New York,' 'I where the court did not allow a record of the Connecticut
decree to be entered into evidence.1 4 That decision was appealed, and the question
102 Id. at 32.
1
0
3 Id. at 37-38.
" Id. at 39 ("[J]urisdiction over the subject matter depended upon domicil, and without such domicil
there was no authority to decree a divorce.").
'sId. at 41.
1
0 6 Id.
1
07 Id. at 41-42.
1
0
8 Id. at 42.
109 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), overruled in part by Williams v. North Carolina
(Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
"1o Id. at 564 ("[T]he parties had been married in New York in 1868, where they both resided and
where the wife continued to reside .... ").
' Id. at 564-65 ("[I]t was averred that the husband, immediately following their marriage, abandoned
the wife .... The answer admitted the marriage, but averred that its celebration was procured by the fraud
of the wife, and that immediately after the marriage the parties had separated by mutual consent.");
see also id. at 606 (Brown, J., dissenting) ("Marriage between these parties was solemnized June 4, 1868.
They separated the same day, without a consummation, and have never lived together since.").
112 Id. at 565 (majority opinion) ("IT]he husband had, in 1881, obtained in a court of the State of
Connecticut a divorce .... ").
13Id at 564 ('The wife, a resident of the State of New York, sued the husband in that State in 1899...."),
"1 Id. at 566 (discussing "the refusal of the court to admit in evidence the Connecticut decree").
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before the United States Supreme Court was whether the Connecticut decree was
denied the faith and credit that it was due. 1
5
When John filed for divorce, he had not had Harriet personally served but instead
had given her notice "by publication and by mailing a copy of the petition to her at
her last known place of residence in the State of New York."'116 The Haddock Court
made clear that full faith and credit guarantees are robust "where a decree rendered
in one State is embraced by the full faith and credit clause that constitutional
provision commands that the other States shall give to the decree the force and effect
to which it was entitled in the State where rendered."' '117 The Court, however, also
suggested that constructive service over a non-resident defendant does not trigger
full faith and credit guarantees--"[w]here a personal judgment has been rendered in
the courts of a State against a non-resident merely upon constructive service and,
therefore, without acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, such
judgment may not be enforced in another State in virtue of the full faith and credit
clause." 18 Here, there was no claim that Connecticut had personal jurisdiction over
Harriet.19
Atherton illustrated that a divorce decree involving a nonresident who had
received constructive notice might nonetheless be subject to full faith and credit
guarantees.120 But Atherton was distinguishable because the marital domicile was in
Kentucky,121 whereas in Haddock the marital domicile was in New York.122 Further,
because the husband abandoned his wife with the intention of avoiding his marital
obligations, the state where he became domiciled did not become the marital
domicile.123 Atherton was thus not controlling, and the divorce decree issued in
Connecticut was not subject to full faith and credit guarantees.
24
Yet, the Haddock Court was not holding that Connecticut was precluded from
altering the status of its domiciliary (John):
Id5 d. at 565-66 ("The Federal question is, Did the court below violate the Constitution of the United
States by refusing to give to the decree of divorce rendered in the State of Connecticut the faith and credit
to which it was entitled?").116 Id. at 566.
17 Id. at 567 (citing Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317 (1905)).
118 Id
119 Id at 572 ("[I is apparent that the Connecticut court did not acquire jurisdiction over the wife... by virtue
of the domicil of the wife within the State or as the result of personal service upon her within its borders.").
120 
See generally Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). I discussed the Atherton case previously
in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 32-55.
121Atherton, 181 U.S. at 171.
' 1"Haddock, 201 U.S. at 572 ('New York was the domicil ofthe wife and the domicil of matfimony").
123 The Haddock Court stated:
Where the domicil of matrimony was in a particular State, and the husband
abandons his wife and goes into another State in order to avoid his marital
obligations, such other State to which the husband has wrongfully fled does not, in
the nature of things, become a new domicil of matrimony ....
Id. at 570.
1"4 See id. at 571-72, 606.
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In view of the authority which government possesses over the marriage
relation, no question can arise on this record concerning the right of the
State of Connecticut within its borders to give effect to the decree of
divorce rendered in favor of the husband by the courts of Connecticut, he
being at the time when the decree was rendered domiciled in that State.
125
To make matters more complicated, Connecticut's recognition that John had
ended his marriage to Harriet did not somehow obligate New York to recognize that
Harriet's marriage to John had ended.126 To give Connecticut that power would
allegedly diminish New York's power to determine the marital status of one of its
domiciliaries (Harriet):
If the fact be that where persons are married in the State of New York
either of the parties to the marriage may, in violation of the marital
obligations, desert the other and go into the State of Connecticut, there
acquiring a domicil, and procure a dissolution of the marriage which
would be binding in the State of New York as to the party to the marriage
there domiciled, it would follow that the power of the State of New York
as to the dissolution of the marriage as to its domiciled citizen would be
of no practical avail.
127
The Haddock holding was in tension with the following Atherton observation:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law.'
28
Admittedly, Haddock did not overrule Atherton-the Haddock Court was not
claiming, for example, that the same state (Connecticut) should view John as
unmarried and Harriet as married. Instead, the Haddock Court was suggesting that
Connecticut should view John as unmarried and that New York was free to view
Harriet as still married to John.
129
Suppose that after having secured his divorce in Connecticut, John moved to New
Jersey and remarried. Suppose further that John died, and Harriet sought to be the
administrator of the estate. Andrews would not control because John had been
domiciled in Connecticut when he had secured his divorce. Nonetheless, Haddock
121 Id. at 572.
126 Cunningham, supra note 74, at 222-23 ("[T]he Court ruled that New York was not required to
extend full faith and credit to a divorce decree granted in an ex parte proceeding by a forum that was
neither the parties' marital domicile nor the absent defendant wife's domicile. Although Connecticut, as
Mr. Haddock's domicile, had the authority to adjudicate his marital status and to give effect within its
borders to such a decree, the Connecticut court had no basis for asserting jurisdiction over Mrs. Haddock,
a New York domiciliary ... " (footnote omitted)).
127 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 574.
128 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901).
129 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 605-06.
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suggests that such a divorce decree would not be subject to full faith and credit
guarantees which means that New Jersey might choose not to recognize the divorce,
much to the consternation of John's purported spouse, who had (allegedly)
celebrated a marriage with John in New Jersey, and any children born into that
(non)marriage. It is perhaps for this reason that Justice Holmes in his Haddock
dissent worried that the decision was "likely to cause considerable disaster to
innocent persons and to bastardize children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of
lawful marriage."'130
Basically, Haddock countenances the possibility that individuals with valid
divorces in one state might nonetheless discover that according to the law of another
state they do not have valid divorces and are still married, and are thus precluded
from remarrying.' Not content with issuing a holding potentially destabilizing
marriage,132 the Haddock Court went even further, discussing "the inherent power
which all governments must possess over the marriage relation, its formation and
dissolution, as regards their own citizens."''33 The Haddock Court further explained:
[W]here a court of one State, conformably to the laws of such State, or the
State through its legislative department, has acted concerning the
dissolution of the marriage tie, as to a citizen of that State, such action is
binding in that State as to such citizen, and the validity of the judgment
may not therein be questioned on the ground that the action of the State in
dealing with its own citizen concerning the marriage relation was
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.'34
Thus, the Haddock Court suggested that the state's power over the marital status
of its domiciliaries is so great that even federal due process guarantees cannot be
used to undermine a domicile's marital status determination.135 However, the Court
did not thereby foreclose a due process challenge in a different state where a party
might argue that the decree did not trigger full faith and credit guarantees because
due process guarantees had been violated.'36
130 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1'l See id. at 605-06 (majority opinion).
1
3 2 The court would later emphasize the importance of marriage by referring to how marriage involves
"a right 'older than the Bill of Rights."' Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (quoting
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
113 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 569.
134 Id. (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)).
135 See id.
136 The Court distinguished the territorial versus extraterritorial implications of its position by
discussing Maynard
The case, therefore, did not concern the extraterritorial efficacy of the legislative divorce. In
other words, whilst the ruling recognized the ample powers which government possesses over
marriage as to one within its jurisdiction, it did not purport to hold that such ample powers
might be exercised and enforced by virtue of the Constitution of the United States in another
jurisdiction as to citizens of other States to whom the jurisdiction of the Territory did not
extend.
See Haddock, 201 U.S. at 575.
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The post-Haddock jurisprudence is very confusing and makes marital status
determinations even more indeterminate in a certain set of cases where individuals
have crossed state lines to obtain divorces. The Court may have appreciated the
difficulties Haddock created and, in any event, modified the jurisprudence to make
marital status determinations more determinate.
C. The Post-Haddock Jurisprudence
Over thirty years later, the Court revisited the Haddock approach in Davis v.
Davis.'3 7 Mark and Maude Davis were domiciled in the District of Columbia until
he sought a divorce a mensa et thoro.3 8 He was awarded custody of their son, and
she was awarded custody of their daughter.'39 He later filed for an absolute divorce
in Virginia, claiming to be a domiciliary of that state while admitting that Maude
was domiciled in the District of Columbia.4 ° She was personally served.'4 ' Maude
appeared "specially," alleging that Mark was not domiciled in Virginia and instead
that "the residence that he was attempting to establish was for the sole purpose of
creating jurisdiction in the court to hear and determine the suit for divorce, and was
therefore a fraud upon the court and not residence in contemplation of law."' 4 2
The court, however, found that Mark was a Virginia domiciliary.
43
Years later, Mark sought to have his support obligation modified, offering three
justifications: (1) the Virginia decree, (2) "his daughter had married and was no
longer living with [Maude]," and (3) his income had decreased.'I" The D.C. Circuit
reasoned that the Virginia decree was not entitled to full faith and credit because,
under Haddock, Virginia had to "be the last matrimonial domicil of the parties, or, if
not, that the wife be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court [below] either by
personal service within the State, or by voluntary appearance and participation in the
suit."'45 That decision was appealed.
146
The Davis Court distinguished Haddock, outlining several differences:
There [in Haddock] the husband, immediately after marriage in New
York, fled to escape his marital obligations and never returned to
discharge any of them. The wife remained in that State. He acquired
137 305 U.S. 32, 35, 41-42 (1938).
138 Id. at 35 ("Petitioner and respondent married in 1909 and, until about the time he brought the suit
for limited divorce, lived together in the District of Columbia"); see also A Mensa Et Thoro, BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2019) (defining the term as "(Of a divorce decree) effecting a separation of
the parties rather than a dissolution of the marriage").
139 Davis, 305 U.S. at 35-36 ("The decree of separation awarded to him custody of the son; to her,
custody of the daughter; and directed him to pay $300 a month for support of wife and daughter.").
' Id. at 36 ("Petitioner's complaint in the Virginia court alleged that he was a resident of that State
for the requisite time, [and] showed that respondent was a resident of the District of Columbia..
141 id.
142 
Id.
143 Id. at 37 ("[T]he court found that petitioner was a resident of Arlington County, Virginia, for the
requisite time; that it had jurisdiction of the 'subject matter and of the parties'; overruled the exceptions,
and confirmed the report.").
144Id. at38.
141 Id. at 39 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 96 F.2d 512, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1938), rev'd, 305 U.S. 32 (1938)).
'" See Davis v. Davis, 304 U.S. 552, 552-53 (1938) (granting certiorari).
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domicil in Connecticut and there obtained absolute divorce. She did not
appear in the Connecticut court for any purpose. There was no suggestion
that she was at fault or did anything to disrupt the marital
relation.
147
Yet, the Davis characterization of Haddock was somewhat misleading. There had
been an allegation that Harriet Haddock had been at fault and had done something to
disrupt the marital relation, namely, that she had perpetrated such a serious fraud as
to make the marriage impossible.148 As to the truth of the allegation that a grievous
fraud had been perpetrated, this was a matter of state law.'49 But if the allegation that
Harriet had fraudulently induced John to marry her were true, then it would not be
clear that Harriet Haddock was without fault and had done nothing to impair the
marriage nor would it be clear that John Haddock had simply abandoned his wife
without cause, especially given the testimony that they had agreed to live apart.50
The Davis Court noted that Harriet Haddock had "not appear[ed] in the
Connecticut court for any purpose,"'' whereas Maude Davis had appeared
"specially."'52 But an individual who appears specially to challenge jurisdiction is
not seeking to address the merits,'53 so it is not clear what point the Court was trying
to convey when noting that Harriet had not appeared for any purpose. Perhaps the
Court was suggesting that Maude would have been wiser not to have appeared at all
in Virginia and instead to have challenged the Virginia court's jurisdiction in the
District of Columbia when pressing her claim that Mark was foisting a fraud on the
court.'54 But such a rule represents an amazing public policy choice. Basically, this
147Davs, 305 U.S. at 41-42.
148 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 564-65 (1906) ("The answer ... averred that its [the
marriage's] celebration was procured by the fraud of the wife .. ").
149 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 566 ("[T]he averments concerning the alleged fraud in contracting the
marriage and the subsequent laches of the wife are solely matters of state cognizance .... "). As another
example, New York law provides as follows:
If the plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of the court that through misrepresentation of some
fact which was an essential element in the giving of his consent to the contract of marriage, and
which was of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, he has been victimized,
the court is empowered to annul the marriage.
Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 67 N.E. 63, 65 (N.Y. 1903).
150 See Haddock, 201 U.S. at 625 (Brown, J., dissenting) ("The testimony leaves it doubtful whether
it was a case of abandonment or of separation by mutual consent.").
i Davis, 305 U.S. at 41.
I52 d. at 36.
'53 See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1931) ("[T]he
special appearance for the purpose of quashing the notice of service did not amount to a general
appearance."); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1895) ("[T]he defendant appeared
specially and for the sole and single purpose of presenting the petition for removal. This was strictly a
special appearance for this purpose only, and, whether the attempt to remove should be successful or
unsuccessful, could not be treated as submitting the defendant o the jurisdiction of the state court for any
other purpose."); see also Davis v. Davis, 96 F.2d 512, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ("[T]he special appearance
of the wife in the Virginia suit was not sufficient to give full jurisdiction. It did not constitute a waiver of
objection to jurisdiction.").
154 The suggestion that not appearing may have been in Maude's best interest can be seen in the
Court's finding that:
2019-2020
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
would induce the party who wishes to contest the divorce to wait and challenge it
later in his or her own jurisdiction. In the meantime, the individual granted the
divorce might marry someone else and start a new family. But the later challenge to
the divorce, if successful, would delegitimize that second family. This policy choice
might well "cause considerable disaster to innocent persons and [] bastardize
children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage.
'155
Presumably, the reason that it was important that John Haddock had (allegedly)
abandoned his wife was that when a husband acquires a new domicile to avoid his
marital obligations, his acquisition of a new domicile does not also entail that the
marital domicile has changed.156 The Court's mentioning Mark's alleged
blamelessness might lead one to infer that the marital domicile had changed by virtue
of Mark Davis having innocently acquired a new domicile.5 7 But such an inference
would be mistaken. As the D.C. Circuit pointed out, the marital domicile does not
change when a husband acquires a new domicile after a court has granted a
separation from bed and board'58-the wife's domicile remains what it was at the
time of separation until she, herself, acquires a new domicile.'59 Just as Connecticut
did not become the marital domicile by virtue of John's having gone there to live,'
60
Virginia did not become the marital domicile by virtue of Mark's having gone there
to live.
161
The Davis Court distinguished Haddock by pointing to but not explaining the
relevance of a number of factors including the (possible) fault of the husband and the
lack of any type of appearance by the wife.'62 Ultimately, the resolution of the case
was not based on the factors that the Court hinted might be relevant but, instead, on
something else-namely, the Davis Court rejected that Maude had in fact only made
[S]he alleged that neither she nor petitioner had been a resident of Virginia for a year before
commencement of the suit; and asserted that he was not then a bona fide resident there, but that
the residence he was attempting to establish was for the sole purpose of creating jurisdiction in
the court to hear and determine the suit for divorce, and was therefore a fraud upon the court
and not residence in contemplation of law.
See Davis, 305 U.S. at 36.
s' See Haddock, 201 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 570 (majority opinion) ("Where the domicil of matrimony was in a particular State, and the
husband abandons his wife and goes into another State in order to avoid his marital obligations, such other
State to which the husband has wrongfully fled does not, in the nature of things, become a new domicil
of matrimony .... ").
117 See Davis, 96 F.2d at 515 (noting that in Atherton "the domicil of the husband was the domicil of
the wife, on the theory that he was the innocent party and that she was guilty of desertion") (citing Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901))).
151 Id. at 515-16 ("Since the District of Columbia court, at the instance of the husband, separated the
parties by a divorce a mensa et thoro and provided for separate maintenance of the wife, there can be no
presumption that the matrimonial domicil shifted to Virginia following the acquisition of a new domicil by
the husband." (citing Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 118 A. 685, 686-87 (N.J. Ch. 1922))).
"9 Id at 515 ("Upon the tennination of the marriage in any way, or upon judicial separation, the wife can
acquire a new domicil; until she does so, she retains the domicil which she had at the time of the termination of the
marriage relation." (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNFLicr OF LAws § 29 (AM. LAW INsT. 1934))).
160 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 572.
161 Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 39 (1938) (discussing the lower court's holding that Virginia was not
the marital domicile)..
162 Id. at 41-42.
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a special appearance.163 Because in the Court's view she had subjected herself to the
jurisdiction of the Virginia court, the Court held that the Virginia decree was subject
to full faith and credit.164
Davis and Haddock are quite compatible. Indeed, Haddock expressly stated:
[W]here a bonafide domicil has been acquired in a State by either of the
parties to a marriage, and a suit is brought by the domiciled party in such
State for a divorce, the courts of that State, if they acquire personal
jurisdiction also of the other party, have authority to enter a decree of
divorce, entitled to be enforced in every State by the full faith and credit
clause.'
65
The Davis Court's having distinguished Haddock, while nonetheless applying it,
may have been intended to send a message sub silentio that the Court was trying to
rein in or modify Haddock. Four years after Davis was issued, the Court did indeed
modify prevailing law.1
66
In Williams v. North Carolina, the Court addressed whether a Nevada divorce
decree was subject to full faith and credit guarantees.167 Otis Baxter Williams had
been married to Carrie Wyke,68 and Lillie Hendrix had been married to Thomas
Hendrix.169 But in 1940, 0. B. Williams and Lillie Hendrix together went to Las
Vegas to divorce their respective spouses.17 Thomas Hendrix was given constructive
notice by having a copy of the summons and complaint mailed to him at his last post
office address,17 1 whereas Carrie Williams was actually served by a local sheriff.
172
163 Id. at 43 ("Plainly her plea and conduct in the Virginia court cannot be regarded as special
appearance merely to challenge jurisdiction. Considered in its entirety, the record shows that she
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court and is bound by its determination that it had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties.").
"6 Id. ("Petitioner is entitled as a matter of right to have the Virginia decree given effect in the courts
of the District of Columbia.").
165 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 570 (citing Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108 (1869)).
166 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942).
167 Id. at 293, 302-04.
168 Id. at 289 ("Petitioner Williams was married to Carrie Wyke in 1916 in North Carolina and lived
with her there until May, 1940.").
169 Id. ("Petitioner Hendrix was married to Thomas Hendrix in 1920 in North Carolina and lived with
him there until May, 1940.").17' Id. ("[P]etitioners went to Las Vegas, Nevada and on June 26, 1940, each filed a divorce action in
the Nevada court.").
171 Id. ("In the case of defendant Thomas Hendrix service by publication was had by publication of
the summons in a Las Vegas newspaper and by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint o his last
post office address.").
172 Id. at 289-90 ("In the case of defendant Carrie Williams a North Carolina sheriff delivered to her
in North Carolina a copy of the summons and complaint."). The trial court discussed the service of Carrie
Williams:
The following affidavit was filed: "I received the within summons on the 18th day of July,
A.D., 1940, and that I personally served the same upon the within named defendant, Mrs. 0.
B. Williams, on the 22nd day of July, A.D., 1940, at Granite Falls, County of Caldwell, North
Carolina, by then and there delivering to her, the said defendant, personally, a copy of said
summons attached to a certified copy of the complaint in the within entitled action. Dated this
22nd day of July, A.D., 1940. J. F. Parlier, Sheriff Caldwell County, State of North Carolina."
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Both 0. B. Williams and Lillie Hendrix were granted divorces on the ground of
extreme cruelty after having met the Nevada six-week residency requirement.173 On
the day that Hendrix's divorce was issued, Williams and Hendrix married.'74 They
then returned to North Carolina,'7 5 where they were eventually charged with
bigamous cohabitation.'76 They denied the charge, "offer[ing] in evidence
exemplified copies of the Nevada proceedings, contending that the divorce decrees
and the Nevada marriage were valid in North Carolina as well as in Nevada.'
177
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the state did not have to recognize
the divorce decrees under Haddock178 and, in addition, suggested that the Nevada
judgments were not subject to full faith and credit because there had been no
jurisdiction to grant the divorces-neither of the Williamses and neither of the
Hendrixes had been domiciled in Nevada when the divorce decrees were issued)1
79
The Williams I Court, however, refused to address whether the divorce decrees were
not subject to full faith and credit "on the easy assumption that petitioners' domicil
in Nevada was a sham and a fraud,"'8° perhaps because North Carolina "admit[ted]
that there probably [wa]s enough evidence in the record to require that petitioners be
considered 'to have been actually domiciled in Nevada."""' Instead, the Court
addressed whether North Carolina could refuse to recognize the divorce even
"if petitioners had resided in Nevada for a term of years and had long ago acquired
a permanent abode there,"'82 which required revisiting Haddock.'8 3
Affidavit of Parlier, dated July 22, 1940, as to service of summons before F. H. Hoover, Clerk
Superior Court of above State and County.
State v. Williams, 17 S.E.2d 769, 776 (N.C. 1941); see also State v. Williams, 29 S.E.2d 744, 746 (N.C.
1944), affd sub nom. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) ("Service of summons was
obtained by publication, and no appearance was made by the defendant, Carrie Ora Williams, albeit notice
was served on her by the sheriff of Caldwell County, North Carolina."); contra Williams 1, 317 U.S. at
313 (Jackson J., dissenting) ("No personal service was made on the home-staying spouse in either case;
and service was had only by publication and substituted service.").
171 Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 290 ("A decree of divorce was granted petitioner Williams by the Nevada
court on August 26, 1940, on the grounds of extreme cruelty, the court finding that 'the plaintiff has been
and now is a bona fide and continuous resident of the County of Clark, State of Nevada, and had been
such resident for more than six weeks immediately preceding the commencement of this action in the
manner prescribed by law'. The Nevada court granted petitioner Hendrix a divorce on October 4, 1940,
on the grounds of wilful neglect and extreme cruelty and made the same finding as to this petitioner's
bona fide residence in Nevada as it made in the case of Williams." (footnote omitted)).
174 Id ("he Nevada court granted petitioner Hendrix a divorce on October 4, 1940, on the grounds of wilful
neglect and extreme cruelty and made the same finding as to this petitioner's bona fide residence in Nevada as it
made in the case of Williams. Petitioners were married to each other in Nevada on October 4,1940.").
175 Id.
176 Id. at 289 ("Petitioners were tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation under § 4342 of the
North Carolina Code .....
177 Id. at 290.
17' Id. at 291 ("The Supreme Court of North Carolina in affirming the judgment held that North
Carolina was not required to recognize the Nevada decrees under the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution (Art. IV, § 1) by reason of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562." (citation omitted)).
179 See id. at 291.
'8
0 
Id. at 292.
'Id. at 291.
'8 2Id. at 292.
183 Id. ("[W]e cannot avoid meeting the Haddock v. Haddock issue in this case ... .
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The Williams I Court noted that many of the facts of the case related to notice
were comparable to the Haddock facts related to notice. But the Haddock Court had
held as follows:
New York, the matrimonial domicil where the wife still resided, need not
give full faith and credit to the Connecticut decree, since it was obtained
by the husband who wrongfully left his wife in the matrimonial domicil,
service on her having been obtained by publication and she not having
entered an appearance in the action.
184
The only difference between the recounted Haddock facts and the facts of
Williams I was that Carrie Williams had actually received service.'85 But the
Williams I Court did not focus on that difference. Instead, the Williams I Court
emphasized the Haddock Court reasoning that "the state granting the divorce had no
jurisdiction over the absent spouse, since it was not the state of the matrimonial
domicil, but the place where the husband had acquired a separate domicil after
having wrongfully left his wife."'
' 86
After recounting the selected facts of Haddock, the Williams I Court expressly
rejected "the theory of the Haddock case that, so far as the marital status of the parties
is concerned, a decree of divorce granted under such circumstances by one state need
not be given full faith and credit in another."'87 The Haddock understanding of the
robustness of full faith and credit guarantees was faulty because "Art. IV, § 1 ...
require[s] that 'not some but full' faith and credit [must] be given judgments of a
state court."'88
The Williams I Court emphasized the importance of at least one party being
domiciled in the state where the divorce is granted, describing it as "essential in order
to give the court jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to extraterritorial
effect."'89 But the individual's being domiciled in the state is not only important for
purposes of giving the decree extraterritorial effect-domicile is also important
because it provides the basis upon which the state is authorized to exercise its
power.' The Court noted that "[e]ach state as a sovereign has a rightful and
legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders,"'
9
naming a few of the many implicated interests such as the "[p]rotection of offspring,
property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities."'92 The Williams
4 1d. at 293.
155 Compare id. at 289-90, with Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 566 (1906). It might be noted
that if the Court had emphasized this difference, then the Court might well have had to treat the
Williamses' divorce differently from the Hendrixes' divorce because there had only been constructive
notice in the latter.
186 Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 297.187 Id. at 293.
' Id. at 294 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938)).
"89 Id. at 297.
19o Id. at 298 ("Domicil creates a relationship to the state which is adequate for numerous exercises
of state power."); see also id. at 318 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's holding that "a state
cannot have divorce jurisdiction unless it is the domicile").
191 Id. at 298 (majority opinion).
192 Id.
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I Court then summed up its position by explaining that "each state by virtue of its
command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage
can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there,
even though the other spouse is absent."'
193
The Williams I Court repudiated the implications of Haddock, as applied to the
case before it, as follows:
Under the circumstances of this case, a man would have two wives, a wife
two husbands.... Each would be a bigamist for living in one state with
the only one with whom the other state would permit him lawfully to live.
Children of the second marriage would be bastards in one state but
legitimate in the other.'
94
Basically, the Williams I Court embraced the Atherton conclusion that
"[a] husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law,"'
' 95
a proposition upon which the Haddock Court had cast doubt.'96 The Williams I Court
further undercut Haddock by emphasizing the importance of respecting due process
guarantees. For example, the Court explained that a state could alter the marital status
of one of its domiciliaries if the constructive notice "meet[s] the requirements of due
process."'97 Justice Frankfurter was more explicit in his concurrence, saying: "If the
actions of the Nevada court had been taken 'without due process of law', the
divorces which it purported to decree would have been without legal sanction in
every state including Nevada."'98 The Haddock Court had not worried about due
process guarantees. Instead, the Haddock Court had noted that permitting one state
to change the marital status of an individual domiciled elsewhere would undermine
the power of the other domicile with respect to the marital status of one of its
domiciliaries.'99 The Williams I Court admitted the implication but explained that
such a result was less significant than the Haddock Court had thought. While it is
true that in some sense a state with more lax divorce rules might undercut the public
policy of a state with more stringent rules, that is merely one of the effects of
enforcing full faith and credit guarantees.2"'
The Court expressly noted that it had not reached "the question as to the power
of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because,
contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds that no bona fide
'9' Id. at 298-99.
19 "Id. at 299-300.
195 Id. at 299 (quoting Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901)).
196 See Cunningham, supra note 74, at 222.
197 Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 298-99 (citing Atherton, 181 U.S. at 172).
19' Id. at 306 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).199 See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1906).
200 Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 302 ("For it is pointed out that under such a rule one state's policy of strict
control over the institution of marriage could be thwarted by the decree of a more lax state. But such an
objection goes to the application of the full faith and credit clause to many situations.").
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domicil was acquired in Nevada.'2°1 The Court then reversed and remanded the
decision to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
2
1
2
There was another trial in North Carolina, where the jury found that Williams
and Hendrix had not been domiciled in Nevada when they had obtained their
respective divorces.2°3 The jury rejected that Hendrix and Williams had established
domicile, obtained their divorces, and then changed their minds, deciding to return
to North Carolina.2° The conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, and then reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
205
The Williams II Court explained, "Under our system of law, judicial power to grant
a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil.' '2 ' The mere
assertion by one state court that a party was domiciled in that state, however, does
not suffice to establish that fact. The Court explained that "simply because the
Nevada court found that it had power to award a divorce decree cannot... foreclose
reexamination by another State. Otherwise, as was pointed out long ago, a court's
record would establish its power and the power would be proved by the record.20 7
Instead, North Carolina had the power to revisit whether in fact Hendrix and
Williams were domiciled in Nevada at the time that the divorce decrees were
issued.208 The Court explained that the Nevada finding of domicile was entitled to
"respect 2 9 and cautioned that states are not free to ignore evidence that particular
201 Id.; see also id. at 321 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The only suggestion of a domicile within Nevada
was a stay of about six weeks at the Alamo Auto Court, an address hardly suggestive of permanence.").
On the contrary:
North Carolina did not base its disregard of the Nevada decrees on the claim that they were a
fraud and a sham, and no claim was made here on behalf of North Carolina that the decrees
were not valid in Nevada. It is indisputable that the Nevada decrees here, like the Connecticut
decree in the Haddock case, were valid and binding in the state where they were rendered.
Id. at 306-07 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).2o2 Id. at 304 (majority opinion).
203 State v. Williams, 29 S.E.2d 744, 751 (N.C. 1944), aff'd, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945) ("[T]he jury has found that the defendants were domiciled in this State when they brought
their actions for divorce in Nevada; that they had acquired no bona fide domicil in that State, and that the
Nevada decrees were ineffectual to sever the marriage ties.").
2" 4 Id. at 750 ("[T]he jury was instructed that if the defendants went to Nevada with the requisite intent
and actually acquired a domicil there, though they later changed their minds and returned to this State, the
courts of that State acquired jurisdiction of the marital status of the defendants and the decrees in evidence
would be entitled to full faith and credit in this State and every other state.").
201 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1/), 325 U.S. 226,227 (1945) ('This case is here to review judgments
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, affirming convictions for bigamous cohabitation .....
206 Id. at 229 (citing Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901)).
207 Id. at 234.
200 Id. at 230 ("As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, upon which depends the
power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to the exertion of such judicial authority in another
State but seriously affected by it has a right, when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain
the truth or existence of that crucial fact.").
209 Id. at 233 ("The fact that the Nevada court found that they were domiciled there is entitled to
respect, and more.").
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individuals were in fact domiciled in the state granting the divorce.2 10 That said,
however, there was enough in the record to justify the conclusion of the North
Carolina court that no domicile had been established in Nevada.
211
The Williams 1I Court understood that permitting a state to examine whether
domicile had been established in a different state would put certain divorce decrees
at risk, which might put individuals "in situations that create unhappy consequences
for them. '212 This, however, is a risk that individuals assume when they go to one
jurisdiction to obtain a divorce and then move shortly or immediately thereafter.
213
The resolution of these matters as evidenced by Williams I and Williams H did
not end all difficulties. As Justice Rutledge noted in his dissent, the North Carolina
finding of an absence of domicile in Nevada would not entail that Nevada could not
recognize the divorce decree that had been issued by a Nevada court, which meant
that "the marriage is good in Nevada, but void in North Carolina.'214 Regrettably,
the result that Atherton and Williams I had sought had not been achieved-namely,
that it could not be the case that he same couple was viewed as married in one state
but not in another. This result, however, is not as damning as might first appear. In
the hypothesized example, the issue of the legality of the divorce recognized in the
forum but not in the domicile (or anywhere else) would presumably not be raised
that often. The reason that the divorce and subsequent marriage were not recognized
(in the domicile) in the first place was that the couple had gone to the forum state,
divorced their respective spouses, married, and then left, thus manifesting that they
had had no intent to be domiciled in the forum. But the couple's having left the forum
immediately after the divorce decrees were issued suggests that the couple chose the
forum state because of its forgiving residency requirements rather than because of
some deep connection to the state, which means that the legality of the divorce
(under forum law) would not come up often if only because the couple would spend
little if any time in that state. The complicated legal issues under Williams I and
Williams 11, such as the fact that the divorce would be recognized in the forum state
but nowhere else, would seem less likely to arise as a practical matter than would the
2 10 Id (CThe challenged judgment must, I-I, satisfy our scrutiny that the reciprocal duty of respect owed by the
States to one another's adjudications has been fairly discharged, and has not been evaded under the guise of finding
an absence of domicil and therefore a want of power in the court rendering the judgment').
2 11 Id at 234 ("But when we are dealing as here with an historic notion common to all English-speaking courts,
that of domicil, we should not find a want of deference to a sister State on the part of a court of another State which
finds an absence of domicil where such a conclusion is warranted by the record.").
212 Id. at 237; see also id. at 234, 239.
213 Id. at 238 ("The petitioners [] assumed the risk that this Court would find that North Carolina
justifiably concluded that they had not been domiciled in Nevada.").
2 1
4 Id. at 247 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). While it is true that Williams II suggests that a couple might
be married to each other in Nevada but married to their former spouses in North Carolina, it is not true
that Williams I had eliminated this problem. Contra Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce
and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 402 (2007) ("Williams II reestablished one of
the problems that Williams I had eliminated: under this reasoning, Williams and Hendrix were validly
divorced in Nevada but still married to their prior spouses in North Carolina."). Williams I expressly
declined to address the consequences that would result from a finding that the Nevada divorce was a sham.
See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942). It also might be noted that the
same problem arose in Andrews. Basically, the Andrews's divorce was valid in South Dakota but not valid
in Massachusetts. See supra text accompanying notes 77-108.
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problems raised under Haddock, where domiciles as a general matter were given
great deference with respect to their determinations of the marital status of their
domiciliaries.
215
D. Continued Clarification of the Jurisprudence
Williams I and Williams H clarified the importance of one of the parties being
domiciled in the forum state if the court was going to have jurisdiction to grant the
divorce. A separate question involves the circumstances under which an individual
can seek to establish that a court lacked jurisdiction to grant the divorce.
Sherrer v. Sherrer involved a married couple, domiciled in Massachusetts, who
had long had marital difficulties.216 Margaret Sherrer went to Florida with the
couple's two children, ostensibly to take a vacation.217 Shortly after arriving there,
however, Margaret told her husband, Edward, that she did not plan on returning to
Massachusetts.218 She found housing and a job and placed her older child in
school.
21 9
Three months later, she filed for divorce, claiming to be domiciled in Florida.
220
Edward hired local counsel, contesting both her claim of domicile and the grounds
asserted for the divorce.22' Later that year, the Florida court issued the divorce,
expressly finding that Margaret had established domicile.22 2 Within a week of the
issuance of the divorce, Margaret married Henry Phelps, whom she had known mif
Massachusetts and who had followed her to Florida shortly after she had left
2 15 cf Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("If there is one thing that the people
are entitled to expect from their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they are
married and, if so, to whom."). The difficulty raised in Williams H is distinguishable from the difficulty raised in
Haddock. The Haddock Court suggested that New York might recognize that John, a Connecticut domiciliary, had
received a valid divorce from Harriet, but nonetheless would not have to recognize that Harriet (a New York
domiciliary) had received a valid divorce from John. The Williams I] Court suggested that according to Nevada both
0. B. and Carrie would have gotten a valid divorce, but that according to North Carolina neither would have gotten
a valid divorce. While these approaches are distinguishable, it is nonetheless rue that both approaches uffer from a
similar defect-4he marital status of two individuals might change just by virtue of their taking a plane ride from one
state to another.
216 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 345 (1948) (discussing "a long period of marital discord").
217 Id. ("[P]etitioner, accompanied by the two children of the marriage, left Massachusetts on the latter
date, ostensibly for the purpose of spending a vacation in the State of Florida.").
218 Id. ("Shortly after her arrival in Florida, however, petitioner informed her husband that she did not
intend to return to him.").2 19 Id. ("Petitioner obtained housing accommodations in Florida, placed her older child in school, and
secured employment for herself.").
22
0 id.
221 Id at 345-46 ('He retained Florida counsel who entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying
the allegations of petitioner's complaint, including the allegation as to petitioner's Florida residence.").222 Id. at 346 ("The Florida court on November 29, 1944, entered a decree of divorce after specifically
finding 'that petitioner is a bona fide resident of the State of Florida, and that this court has jurisdiction of
the parties and the subject matter in said cause."').
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Massachusetts.223 They lived together as a married couple in Florida for a few months
and then returned to Massachusetts.22 4
A few months later, Edward Sherrer filed suit in Massachusetts, challenging the
validity of Margaret's Florida divorce and claiming that they were still married
because the divorce issued in Florida was void for lack of jurisdiction and thus her
subsequent marriage to Phelps was also void.22' The Massachusetts court found that
she had never been domiciled in Florida.226 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed, finding that "the requirements of full faith and credit did not
preclude the Massachusetts courts from reexamining the finding of domicile made
by the Florida court.
227
When reversing the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision,22 the
Sherrer Court explained:
[T]he requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from
collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the
courts of a sister State where there has been participation by the defendant
in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full
opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is
not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which
rendered the decree.
229
Yet, Andrews seemed to preclude such a holding.230 The Sherrer Court noted that
Andrews could be distinguished23' because there the defendant had withdrawn her
appearance rather than litigate whether her husband was in fact domiciled in South
Dakota.232 Rather than rely on that difference, however, the Court noted that the
Andrews analysis had been superseded by subsequent developments in the case
law.233 Further, the fact that Massachusetts was making a decision about the marital
status of current domiciliaries did not give the state the power to revisit the validity
of the divorce.23 4 The Court explained that the fact "[t]hat vital interests are involved
223 Id. at 347 ("On December 1, 1944, petitioner was married in Florida to one Henry A. Phelps,
whom petitioner had known while both were residing in Massachusetts and who had come to Florida
shortly after petitioner's arrival in that State.").
224 Id. ("Phelps and petitioner lived together as husband and wife in Florida, where they were both
employed, until February 5, 1945, when they returned to Massachusetts.").
225 Id. ("Respondent alleged that he is the lawful husband of petitioner, that the Florida decree of
divorce is invalid, and that petitioner's subsequent marriage is void.").226 Id at 347-48 ("The Probate Court, however, resolved the issues of fact adversely to petitioner's contentions,
found that she was never domiciled in Florida, and granted respondent he relief he had requested.").
227 Id. at 348.
228 Id. at 356.
229 Id. at 351-52.
230 Id. at 352 ("It is suggested, however, that Andrews v. Andrews militates against he result we have
reached." (citation omitted)).
231 Id. at 353 ("On its facts, the Andrews case presents variations from the present situation.").232 See id. at 353 n.20.
233 Id. at 353 ("But insofar as the rule of that case may be said to be inconsistent with judgment herein
announced, it must be regarded as having been superseded by subsequent decisions of this Court.").
234 See id. at 354 ("But the recognition of the importance of a State's power to determine the incidents
of basic social relationships into which its domiciliaries enter does not resolve the issues of this case.").
Vol. 108
DIVORCE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION
in divorce litigation indicates to us that it is a matter of greater rather than lesser
importance that there should be a place to end such litigation.
235
Basically, Sherrer precludes individuals from having multiple bites at the
(litigation) apple-once an individual has litigated in one jurisdiction whether his or
her soon-to-be ex-spouse was domiciled there, that individual will not be allowed to
relitigate the issue in a different jurisdiction merely because of dissatisfaction with
the initial result.236 A separate question, however, is whether the state's interests in
its domiciliaries' marriages is adequately protected under Sherrer. In his Sherrer
dissent, Justice Frankfurter noted that states themselves have an interest in assuring
that courts issuing divorce decrees in other states have the authority to do SO.
237
Justice Frankfurter seemed especially worried that private parties might circumvent
the power of their domicile over their marriage via private agreement.8
The federal case law on divorce jurisdiction seems relatively straightforward in
at least a few respects. A court does not have the authority to grant a divorce unless
at least one of the parties is domiciled in that jurisdiction. Individuals who participate
in the divorce proceeding and contest the court's jurisdiction, however, will not be
afforded an opportunity to challenge the divorce decree collaterally when their initial
challenge was unsuccessful.
II. STATE COURTS AND THE DOMICILE REQUIREMENT
Several states have rejected that courts only have jurisdiction to grant a divorce
if one of the parties is domiciled in that jurisdiction. Various justifications, some
quite sympathetic, have been offered to justify not requiring that at least one of the
parties be domiciled in the forum state. Until the Court rejects the approach that it
has used for over a century, however, individuals may put themselves (and their
possible future families) at risk if securing divorces in jurisdictions where they are
not domiciled.
23 Id. at 356.
236 See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 586-89 (1951) (holding that a daughter was prevented
from mounting a collateral attack on jurisdiction when her father, as defendant, "participat[ed] . . . in
[] divorce proceedings... [and had] been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues");
Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 384 (1948) (holding that an individual who participated in divorce proceedings
could not later attack the judgment collaterally claiming lack of jurisdiction); see also Robert H.
Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C. L. REV. 59, 90 n.181 (1984)
("Subsequent decisions have applied issue preclusion to contested determinations of domicile and have
not permitted a second forum to relitigate the jurisdiction issue.").
237 Sherer, 334 U.S. at 358 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("A State that is asked to enforce the action of another
State may appropriately ascertain whether that other State had power to do what it purported to do.").
238 Id. ("And if the enforcing State has an interest under our Constitution in regard to the
subject-matter that is vital and intimate, it should not be within the power of private parties to foreclose
that interest by their private arrangement.").
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A. Military Divorces
Several states have laws specifying that military personnel who have resided in
the state for the requisite period may file for divorce in that jurisdiction.2
39 These
laws are at least potentially problematic insofar as they are suggesting that residence
but not domicile is required.2"
In Wallace v. Wallace, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a trial court had
jurisdiction to issue a divorce, even assuming that neither of the parties was
domiciled in New Mexico.24' New Mexico had a statute authorizing courts to issue
divorces to individuals who had been stationed in New Mexico for a year.2
42 Because
that condition was met and because it was "within the power of the legislature to
establish reasonable bases of jurisdiction other than domicile," the court saw no
difficulty in affirming the decision below.
2 43
The Wallace court reasoned that the "domiciliary requirement is designed to
prevent divorce-minded couples from shopping for favorable residence
requirements,"244 and then noted that the requirement had not been particularly
effective in achieving that purpose.245 If the goal were really to prevent forum-
shopping, then "[t]he result [would] more nearly [be] reached under a statute, such
239 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 16-902(e) (West 2012) ("Ifa member of the armed forces ofthe United
States resides in the District of Columbia for a continuous period of 6 months during his or her period of
military service, he or she shall be deemed to reside in the District of Columbia for purposes of this section
only."); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-2 (West 2019); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07(1) (West 2013) ("[N]o
dissolution shall be granted unless: [] one of the parties has resided in this state, or has been a member of
the armed services stationed in this state, for not less than 180 days immediately preceding the
commencement of the proceeding .... ); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-18 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-4-30 (2019) ("The plaintiff in an action for divorce or separate maintenance must, at the time
the action is commenced, be a resident of this state, or be stationed in this state while a member of the
armed services. Subsequently, the plaintiff need not maintain that residence or military presence to be
entitled to the entry of a decree or judgment of divorce or separate maintenance.").
240 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-30 ("Subsequently, the plaintiff need not maintain that
residence or military presence to be entitled to the entry of a decree or judgment .... "). Some states try
to circumvent the issue by suggesting that an individual who has been stationed in the state for the requisite
period will be presumed to be a domiciliary of the state. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.304 (West
2011) (stating that an individual in the armed forces meeting such requirements "is considered to be a
Texas domiciliary and a resident of that county ... for the purpose of filing suit for dissolution of a
marriage"); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97(1) (West 2017) (requiring that a member of the armed forces meeting
a specific time requirement "be presumed to be domiciled in and to have been a bona fide resident of this
Commonwealth during such period of time").
241 Wallace v. Wallace, 320 P.2d 1020, 1022 (N.M. 1958) ("Assuming that appellant is correct in his
contention that the parties were not domiciled in New Mexico at the time instant action was filed, does it
follow that the court was without jurisdiction? We think not.").
242 The 1953 statute, according to the Court, read as follows:
[Plersons serving in any military branch of the United States government who have been
continuously stationed in any military base or installation in the state of New Mexico for such
period of one (1) year, shallfor the purposes hereof be deemed residents in good faith of the
state and county where such military base or installation is located.
Id. at 1021-22.
243 Id. at 1022, 1025.
244 Id. at 1022-23.
245 Id. at 1023 ("The concept of domicile has been notably unsuccessful in achieving this goal.").
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as the one in question, which in effect grounds jurisdiction on the strength of the
facts connecting the parties to the state of the forum. 246 All else equal, an individual
who has to remain in a state for a whole year would be less likely to go there for
forum-shopping purposes than would someone who only had to spend six weeks in
the jurisdiction. Precisely because it would not be difficult to pretend to be domiciled
in a state where only six weeks' residence was required, a divorce decree from such
a jurisdiction might be more subject to collateral attack than would a decree from a
jurisdiction requiring residence for a year.
247
While the Wallace court may have been correct that the domicile requirement is
thought to deter forum-shopping and that a longer residency requirement might more
effectively serve that goal,248 the court may have been incorrect that the only
(or even primary) reason that domicile is required is to reduce forum-shopping. The
Court has implied that the domicile has a special interest in marital status that a
non-domicile lacks.249 In Sosna v. Iowa, the Court noted that a one-year residency
requirement would make successful collateral attacks less likely, 250 but nonetheless
affirmed that "judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is
founded on domicil.""2 5
An additional point might be emphasized that was not given adequate
consideration by the Wallace court. While jurisdictions might impose a year-long
residency requirement before divorce decrees can be issued, jurisdictions need not
have such a lengthy residency requirement.25 2 Indeed, a jurisdiction might claim that
current residency is not required,253 perhaps if the couple celebrated their marriage
in that jurisdiction.214 If the Court were to hold that domicile is not required, the
246 Id.
2 47 Cf id (discussing why a one-year residency requirement ispreferable to a six-week residency requirement).
248 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 408 (1975) (noting that "a one-year residency requirement...
provides a greater safeguard against successful collateral attack").
249 For example, the Court once noted as follows:
The State has a considerable interest in preventing bigamous marriages and in protecting the
offspring of marriages from being bastardized. The interest of the State extends to its
domiciliaries. The State should have the power to guard its interest in them by changing or
altering their marital status and by protecting them in that changed status throughout the
farthest reaches of the nation.
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948); see also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541 (1953) ("The
wife's marital ties may be dissolved without personal jurisdiction over her by a state where the husband
has a genuine domicile because the concern of that state with the welfare and marital status of its
domiciliary is felt to be sufficiently urgent."); Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 300
(1942) (discussing "the power of a state to alter the marital status of its domiciliaries").
250 See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 408.
251 Id. at 407 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945)).
252 Wheat v. Wheat, 318 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Ark. 1958) ("Arkansas is one of the five states in which
the necessary period of residence is relatively short. In Idaho and Nevada the period is six weeks, in
Wyoming sixty days, in Arkansas three months before judgment, and in Utah three months before the
commencement of suit.").
253 But see Jennings v. Jennings, 36 So. 2d 236, 237-38 (Ala. 1948) ("Has the court by virtue of the
statute the power to render a decree of divorce when not only the respondent, but also the complainant
resides in another state? We do not think so.").
254 For example, a New York judge opined as follows:
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Court would then have to decide whether there were constitutional constraints on
how short of a residency period was required before a court in that jurisdiction could
issue a divorce. Otherwise, a state might require either a very short or, perhaps, no
residency requirement before issuing a divorce decree. The Wallace fears about the
destabilizing effects caused by forum-shopping might then only be aggravated.
States can set the residency requirement that they think appropriate, but
additional argumentation is required to justify having a particular residency
requirement instead of rather than in addition to a requirement of domicile.
One commentator hypothesized that states replace the domicile requirement to
supplement the income of local attorneys,25 5 although other justifications might be
offered for not requiring domicile. For example, one worry associated with requiring
domicile in addition to residence is that the former requirement may simply induce
individuals to perjure themselves with respect to their intent to remain indefinitely
in the state so that they can meet the domicile requirement.256 A related worry
involves maintaining the integrity of judgments-a court might make a reasonable
judgment that a person is domiciled in the state so a divorce can be issued, but then
find that the person immediately leaves the state after securing the divorce, thus
putting the validity of the judgment at risk even though the court's finding of
domicile was quite reasonable at the time the decree was issued.257 While the court
might have "reached its decision in the utmost good faith, the want of domicile
becomes retroactively so demonstrable that the issue must be decided the other way
when the decree is relied upon in another state.
258
[]t seems clear to me that the State in which a marriage takes place has certainly as great and
as legitimate an interest in the marital status of the parties to that marriage, and that marriage
in a State consequently is as good a basis ofjurisdiction of divorce as is domicile of one of the
parties in the State.
David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649, 655 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); id. at 657 ("1 conclude,
therefore, that marriage within the State is a fact sufficient of itself to enable a State to confer upon its
courts jurisdiction of an action to dissolve that marriage ....").
255 Roddey M. Ligon, Jr., Is Domicile a Jurisdictional Prerequisite to a Valid Divorce Decree?, U.S.
A.F. JAG BULL., Jan. 1961, at 9 ("Several states, possibly motivated by a desire to give the local bar a
larger share of the divorce dollar, have enacted statutes specifying that servicemen who have been
stationed at a military installation located within such state for a specified period of time have satisfied
the state's residence requirements.").
256 Wheat, 318 S.W.2d at 795 ("It is a matter of common knowledge that every year thousands of
unhappily married persons, unable to obtain divorces at home, visit one or another of these five states in
search of marital freedom. It is equally well known that the need for proof of domicile leads to perjury in
a vast number of instances."); see also Klindt v. Klindt, 888 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("[A]
person's 'residence' or 'domicile' is established by an intention to live at a place permanently, or for an
indefinite time, combined with 'actual bodily presence' in that place." (quoting Sharp v. Sharp, 416
S.W.2d 691, 695 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967))).
257 The Wheat Court explained the difficulty courts face in determining domicile:
Domicile differs from residence only in the existence of a subjective intent to remain more or
less permanently in the particular state. Whether that intent exists on the part of a person who
comes to Arkansas can seldom be proved with any measure of certainty. Often it is only after
the court has decided this perplexing question that the lack of intent becomes apparent, as when
the successful plaintiff immediately leaves the state.
Wheat, 318 S.W.2d at 797.
258 id.
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Suppose that worries about perjury or the integrity ofjudgments are put aside. It
may be that requiring an individual to file for divorce in her domicile will be too
burdensome. While "every person has a domicile somewhere,"25 9 a requirement hat
the parties file in that domicile may mean, as a practical matter, that members of the
military will be denied access to divorce.26 It is not clear how making it practically
impossible for parties to divorce benefits the parties themselves or society as a whole,
and the concern that individuals have effectively been denied access to divorce has
induced some states not to require domicile in other contexts as well.
B. Same-Sex Divorce Litigation
Before the Court issued Obergefell v. Hodges,261 some states recognized
same-sex marriages, 62 while others did not.263 A state that did not recognize
same-sex marriages might have been unwilling to grant a divorce to a same-sex
couple.2' A couple domiciled in a state that refused to grant them a divorce would
then have had relatively few options--one of the parties might have to establish
domicile in a state that granted such divorces.26 Or, the same-sex couple might
decide to divorce in the state where they had married if local law permitted them to
do so.
266
Suppose that a same-sex couple had been unable to divorce in their domicile and
instead had availed themselves of a local law permitting them to divorce in the
259 Craig v. Craig, 56 P.2d 464, 466 (Kan. 1936).
26 1 Id. ("The result, for all practical purposes, is that many persons on military reservations are outside
the law relative to actions for divorce.").
261 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
262 State Same-Sex Marriage State Laws Map, GOVERNING: FUTURE STATES & LOCALITIES,
https://www.goveming.com/gov-data/same-sex-marriage-civil-unions-doma-laws-by-state.html
[https://perma.cc/JR5A-L53V] (listing 37 states that had legalized gay marriage before the Supreme Court
decided Obergefell).
263 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 ("These cases come from Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee, States that define marriage as a union between one man and one woman.").
264 Compare In re Marriage ofJ.B. & H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) ("Texas district
courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a same-sex divorce case."), with Brandon-Thomas
v. Brandon-Thomas, 163 So. 3d 644, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("The practical impact of the trial
court's order is that a validly married couple, albeit of the same sex, cannot access a Florida court to undo
their marriage.... Our decision today protects the parties' rights of access to the court for dissolution of
their marriage and an opportunity to be heard regarding their claimed rights to their assets and the child."
(citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971))).265 See Cerutti-O'Brien v. Cerutti-O'Brien, 928 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (affirming
the trial court's holding that a divorce could not be issued to a same-sex couple when at the time neither
had been domiciled in the state but also noting that one of the parties who had since established domicile
in the state could now file for divorce).266 
See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 16-902(b)(1) (West 2012) ("An action for divorce or legal separation by persons
of the same gender, even if neither party to the marriage is a bona fide resident of the District of Columbia at the time
the action is commenced, shall be maintainable if the following apply- (A) The marriage was performed in the
District of Columbia; and (B) Neither party to the marriage resides in a jurisdiction that will maintain an action
for divorce or legal separation."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07(2Xa) (West 2013) ("If neither party to the civil
marriage is a resident of this state at the commencement of the proceeding, a court of this state has jurisdiction over
the dissolution if (1) the civil marriage was performed in this state; and (2) neither party to the civil marriage resides
in ajurisdiction that will maintain an action for dissolution by the parties because of the sex or sexual orientation of
the spouses!).
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jurisdiction in which they had celebrated their marriage. Assuming that each
personally appeared in the proceeding, neither would be able to challenge the divorce
collaterally by claiming that neither of the parties had been domiciled in the state and
thus the court had lacked jurisdiction to issue the decree.
2 67
Suppose, instead, that one member of a same-sex marriage had taken advantage
of the opportunity provided by local law of obtaining a divorce in the state where the
couple had married. An ex parte divorce is subject to a collateral challenge alleging
lack of jurisdiction based on neither party having been domiciled in the state.268 The
(possibly former) spouse could contest such a divorce in his or her own jurisdiction
claiming that the court had lacked authority to issue the decree.
Once Obergefell was decided in 2015, a state could no longer claim that it could
refuse to issue same-sex divorces because that jurisdiction did not recognize
same-sex marriages and thus there was no jurisdiction to consider whether to issue a
same-sex divorce.269 Ex parte divorces issued by the state of celebration
(but not domicile) prior to 2015 might still be subject to collateral attack, however.
270
Certainly, an individual who benefited from the divorce might later be estopped from
challenging it.27 ' But an individual who had not benefited might still be able to have
the divorce invalidated, even if the "ex"-spouse had subsequently remarried. 
72
The same point might be made about military divorces or any divorce secured on
the basis of residence but not domicile. While states might have good policy reasons
to justify permitting an individual to file for divorce so long as she has been a resident
267 Cf Wallace v. Wallace, 320 P.2d 1020, 1024 (N.M. 1958) ("[Sluffice it to say that since the
appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court he would not be allowed to attack the decree collaterally
in another state. Nor may this decree, wherein the defendant appeared and had an opportunity to question
the jurisdiction of the court, be attacked by a third party in a sister state since it is not subject to collateral
attack in this state." (citations omitted)). In the Wallace case, both parties had appeared. Id. at 1021, 1024.
261 Walker v. Walker, 200 A.2d 267, 268 (Vt. 1964) ("It is settled constitutional law that the doctrine
of full faith and credit does not bar relitigation of the issue of domicile as the jurisdictional basis of an
ex parte divorce." (citing Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I1), 325 U.S. 226 (1945))); see also Sosna
v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) ("[J]udicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly
speaking-is founded on domicil." (quoting Williams II, 325 U.S. at 229)).
269 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584, 2607-08 (2015) (stitldng down same-sex marriage bans as a
violation of federal constitutional guarantees). For an example of a pre-Obergefell approach, see; Chambers v.
Ormiston, 935 A2d 956, 967 (RI. 2007) ("[T'he word 'marriage' in § 8-10-3(a), the statute which empowers the
Family Court 'to hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage,' was not intended by the
General Assembly to empower the Family Court to hear and determine petitions for divorce involving (in the words
of the certified question) 'two persons of the same sex who were purprtedly married in another state."' (quoting
Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd v. Valley Falls Fire Dist, 505 A.2d 1170, 1171 (R-I. 1986))).
27o Compare Sargent v. Sargent, 307 A.2d 353, 357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) (wife permitted to challenge
ex parte divorce for lack ofjurisdiction over five years after the divorce decree had been issued), with Self
v. Self, 893 S.W.2d 775, 779-80 (Ark. 1995) ("In the case at bar, Mildred was advised within two weeks
after entry of the divorce decree that it was a voidable decree, and yet she let it remain in effect for
twenty-four years.... Under these circumstances we have no hesitance in holding that the chancellor
erred in failing to apply the doctrine of laches to Mildred's petition.").
271 E.g., Peterson v. Goldberg, 585 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) ("[O]ne who remarries
in reliance upon an ex parte judgment of divorce is estopped from contesting the effectiveness of the
judgment." (citations omitted)).
272 E.g., Guerieri v. Guerieri, 183 A.2d 499, 504 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962) ("In the case at bar
the divorce procured by John Guerieri, Jr., in Alabama is not valid in New Jersey. He has since remarried
and has been living with his new spouse as husband and wife. A divorce will therefore be granted to the
petitioner, Mary Guerieri, on the ground of the adultery of her husband, John Guerieri, Jr.").
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for the requisite period,2 7 3 and state courts have sometimes upheld the refusal to
require domicile against constitutional challenge,274 an ex parte divorce challenged
collaterally for lack of jurisdiction would not be immune from invalidation merely
because the state courts had held that domicile was not required. As Justice Holmes
has noted, "[s]tate courts do not always have the Constitution of the United States
vividly present to their minds.
275
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has not recently addressed whether a court has
jurisdiction to grant a divorce even if neither party is domiciled in that state, although
the past jurisprudence suggests that the Court, if asked, would say "no." '276 The Court
has suggested that jurisdiction to grant a divorce is based on domicile,277 and that an
ex parte divorce decree issued when neither party is domiciled in that state is not
entitled to full faith and credit.
278
Individuals acting in accordance with state law may nonetheless be at risk if they
divorce where they reside if they, in addition, are not domiciled there. That risk can
be contained-as long as both parties appear, neither party will later be permitted to
challenge the divorce decree collaterally alleging a lack of jurisdiction. Basically,
this means that even if the court in fact lacked jurisdiction to grant the divorce,
neither party will be permitted to make use of that lack of jurisdiction to have the
divorce decree invalidated. But ex parte divorces are not similarly immunized from
273 For an example of a state's residency period requirement, see the following:
[N]o dissolution shall be granted unless:
(1) one of the parties has resided in this state... for not less than 180 days immediately
preceding the commencement of the proceeding; or
(2) one of the parties has been a domiciliary of this state for not less than 180 days
immediately preceding commencement of the proceeding.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.07(1) (West 2013) (emphasis added).2 74 See, e.g., Wheat v. Wheat, 318 S.W.2d 793,797 (Ark. 1958) (upholding state law based on residency rather
than domicile); Craig v. Craig, 56 P.2d 464 (Kan. 1936) (upholding divorce based on residence rather than domicile).
275 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 632 (1906) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
276 Ligon, Jr., supra note 255, at 11 ("The United States Supreme Court has never had to decide the
precise question whether some relationship between the state and the litigants other than domicile will
suffice for purposes of divorce jurisdiction. That Court has, however, made statements indicating that if
the question were presented the answer might very well be 'no."').
277 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975) ('[Jfudicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly
speaking--is founded on domicil." (quoting Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11), 325 U.S. 226,229 (1945))).
27 The Williams ICourt discussed the importance of domicile in conferring authority over divorce:
In recognition of the paramount interest of the state of domicile over the marital status of its
citizens, this Court has held that actual good faith domicile of at least one party is essential to
confer authority and jurisdiction on the courts of a state to render a decree of divorce that will
be entitled to extraterritorial effect under the Full Faith and Credit Clause ....
Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 308-09 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing
Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901)); see also Jennings v. Jennings, 36 So. 2d 236, 237 (Ala. 1948)
("Jurisdiction, which is the judicial power to grant a divorce, is founded on domicile under our system of
law." (citing Williams I1, 325 U.S. at 237-39)).
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subsequent attack, and individuals acting in accord with local law may nonetheless
find that their allegedly valid divorces are subsequently found to be invalid, thereby
negating in the eyes of the law any families subsequently formed.
Perhaps a state legislature is permitted to make the judgment that the benefits of
providing convenient access to divorce outweigh the costs that might be imposed
were a divorce subsequently to be found not entitled to full faith and credit.
279
But individuals who take advantage of such a law might pay a heavy price later and,
at the very least, are entitled to know whether their following local law when seeking
a divorce might nonetheless mean that their divorces and any subsequent remarriages
would be subject to non-recognition. In his Estin dissent, Justice Jackson suggested
that "[i]f there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their lawmakers,
it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether they are married and, if
so, to whom. '280 The same point might be made about members of the other
branches, and the Court should make clear at the earliest opportunity whether
domicile is still required for a court to be able to issue a divorce and for such a decree
to trigger full faith and credit guarantees.
279 See Wheat V. Wheat, 318 S.W.2d 793,796 (Ark. 1958) ("Even if the act deprives the decree of prima facie
extraterritorial validity when the Arkansas court fails to make a finding of domicile, it was for the legislature to say
whether this disadvantage is outweighed by the beneficial consequences of the statute.").
28 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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